A fundamental principle of products liability law tells us that manufacturers are only responsible for warning of the risk of harm posed by the use of their own products. A manufacturer is not responsible for warning of risk when a third-party adds a dangerous component to an otherwise harmless-or already adequately warned-product. Such a position furthers the policy interests of manufacturers. Manufacturers should not have to bear the costs of monitoring numerous, unpredictable downstream uses of-or modifications to-their products. To require manufacturers to warn of such risks would be contrary to a fundamental economic principle of tort law: liability should be assigned such that the costs of preventing harm, and the costs of compensating for actual harms, are assigned in a way that reduces the economic burden. In Air & Liquid Systems Corporation v. DeVries, the Supreme Court held that, in maritime law, a bare-metal manufacturer has a duty to warn of harms its equipment might cause when a third-party later adds a harmful component-such as asbestos insulation-to a product with otherwise adequate warnings. In reaching this holding, the Court developed a new three-part rule, which required that: (1) a manufacturer's product is functionally dependent on incorporation of a component part; (2) a manufacturer knows or has reason to know that the final, integrated product is likely dangerous; and (3) a manufacturer has no reason to believe that the integrated products' users will know that it is dangerous. Fundamental to the Court's calculus were the facts that the harmed parties were enlisted in the U.S. Navy, and that maritime law has, for a long time, provided a special solicitude for sailors. This Comment argues that there are three reasons why the Court was wrong in finding that manufacturers of otherwise adequately warned products have a duty to warn of harms caused by later added components. First, the Court overapplied the special solicitude for sailors doctrine. Second, that defaulting liability to a solvent manufacturer is inconsistent with common law tort principles. And third, that a bare-metal manufacturer should have no duty to warn when an organization, such as the U.S. Navy, voluntarily adopts other means, such as training, to mitigate the risk of harm to users of a product to which it adds a harmful component. The consequence of the Court's decision is an expansion of liability for failure to warn for cases sounding in maritime law, an expansion which could now more easily spread into nonmaritime contexts.