Health & Environmental Research Online (HERO)


Print Feedback Export to File
7227291 
Journal Article 
An Analysis of NIST SP 800-90A 
Woodage, J; Shumow, Dan; , 
2019 
SPRINGER INTERNATIONAL PUBLISHING AG 
CHAM 
151-180 
WOS:000483516200006 
We investigate the security properties of the three deterministic random bit generator (DRBG) mechanisms in NIST SP 800-90A [2]. The standard received considerable negative attention due to the controversy surrounding the now retracted DualEC-DRBG, which appeared in earlier versions. Perhaps because of the attention paid to the DualEC, the other algorithms in the standard have received surprisingly patchy analysis to date, despite widespread deployment. This paper addresses a number of these gaps in analysis, with a particular focus on HASH-DRBG and HMAC-DRBG. We uncover a mix of positive and less positive results. On the positive side, we prove (with a caveat) the robustness [13] of HASH-DRBG and HMAC-DRBG in the random oracle model (ROM). Regarding the caveat, we show that if an optional input is omitted, then contrary to claims in the standard HMAC-DRBG does not even achieve the (weaker) property of forward security. We then conduct a more informal and practice-oriented exploration of flexibility in the standard. Specifically, we argue that these DRBGs have the property that partial state leakage may lead security to break down in unexpected ways. We highlight implementation choices allowed by the overly flexible standard that exacerbate both the likelihood, and impact, of such attacks. While our attacks are theoretical, an analysis of two open source implementations of CTR-DRBG shows that these potentially problematic implementation choices are made in the real world. 
Ishai, Y; Rijmen, V; 
978-3-030-17655-6 
38th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques (EUROCRYPT) 
Darmstadt, GERMANY